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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Florida has historically provided less discretionary power to agen-
cies than the federal system has. Compared to the federal regulatory 
                                                                                                                       
   Florida State University College of Law, J.D. Candidate, 2017. I would like to 
thank a number of people for their assistance during the note-writing process, without 
whom this Note would not be a reality. First, I thank my family and friends for all of their 
support and encouragement. In particular, I would like to thank my father, Judge John 
Van Laningham, for providing the inspiration for this piece and for his guidance and in-
sight into the inner-workings of Florida Administrative Law. Second, thank you to Profes-
sor Hannah Wiseman for advising me through the research and writing process. And final-
ly, I would like to thank the Volume 43 Board for all of their hard work in preparing this 
piece for publication. 
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scheme, Florida is downright stingy. The federal system starts from a 
position of deference to agency decisions and often gives broad discre-
tion to agencies in terms of rulemaking authority. Florida starts from 
a position of inherent distrust: agency rulemaking authority is lim-
ited to specific delegation by the legislature1 and, in the event of am-
biguity in the statutory text, the text is to be interpreted to provide 
less agency power.  
 Florida prohibits deference to agencies on paper, but are the 
courts actually less deferential in practice? In 1996, the legislature 
tightened the procedures that govern rulemaking authority in section 
120.52(8), Florida Statutes. The amendments marked a dramatic 
change that ran counter to the courts’ tendency to provide federal-
like deference to agencies.2 In the first case to interpret the new stat-
utory language in section 120.52, St. Johns River Water Management 
District v. Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co.,3 the First District Court of 
Appeal (“DCA”) found the statutory language ambiguous and broad-
ened agency rulemaking authority to situations in which the rule fell 
within the agency’s “class of powers and duties.” The legislature dis-
agreed with the opinion’s reasoning and amended the statute in 1999 
to fix the perceived ambiguity.  
 Since 1999, the courts have followed the legislative mandate to 
narrowly construe statutory delegations of authority to agencies. But 
the First DCA potentially changed all of that in its recent decision, 
United Faculty of Florida v. Florida State Board of Education.4 In 
that decision, the First DCA upheld a rule promulgated by the Flori-
da State Board of Education (“Board”) concerning continuing con-
tracts, despite the fact that the statutory provisions provided by the 
Board as the source of its rulemaking authority never once men-
tioned continuing contracts. The court determined that because the 
legislature intended for the Board to adopt rules about contracting 
and tenure generally, the rule about continuing contracts fell within 
the Board’s rulemaking authority.  
 This Note will argue that United Faculty returned to the “class of 
powers and duties” analysis that was expressly invalidated by the 
legislature in 1999. It will also argue that the reason United Faculty 
returned to a broader rulemaking authority standard was because 
the courts have a tendency to gravitate toward a federal standard of 
deference. Because of this tendency, the legislature should not amend 
section 120.52(8) to clarify the statutory language. Instead, this Note 
                                                                                                                       
 1. Unless otherwise indicated, “legislature” refers to the Florida Legislature. 
 2. This Note focuses primarily on opinions from the Florida District Courts of Appeal 
(“DCAs”), but it also refers to Department of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) cases 
when relevant. Unless otherwise indicated, “the courts” refers to the DCAs and DOAH. 
 3. 717 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). 
 4. 157 So. 3d 514 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). 
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urges the courts to return to the narrower analysis of section 
120.52(8) as set forth in Board of Trustees of the Internal Improve-
ment Trust Fund v. Day Cruise Ass’n.5 Because the approach advo-
cated in Day Cruise is still good law, the courts can return to an 
analysis consistent with the legislature’s wishes without drastic 
change.  
 Part II of this Note briefly discusses the separation of powers and 
nondelegation doctrines. Part III explores the history of the Florida 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and how that history reflects 
the legislature’s express choice to limit agency discretion. In particu-
lar, Part III describes the changes made in the 1996 amendments to 
the APA and Consolidated-Tomoka’s interpretation of those amend-
ments. Part IV describes the amendments to section 120.52(8) of the 
1999 APA and the legislature’s express rejection of Consolidated-
Tomoka’s analysis. Part V explores Southwest Florida Water Man-
agement District v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc.6 and Day Cruise and 
their differing analyses of the 1999 amendments. Part VI analyzes 
the United Faculty decision, which returned to the “class of duties 
and powers” analysis rejected by the legislature in 1999. Part VII 
discusses whether the United Faculty decision actually marks a re-
turn to a broader deference standard in rulemaking challenges and, 
if so, what can be done to limit the impact of the decision.  
II.   SEPARATION OF POWERS AND NONDELEGATION 
 Two doctrines frequently appear in administrative law: separation 
of powers and nondelegation. The two concepts are inextricably 
linked. Generally speaking, separation of powers describes a system 
of government in which the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches have independent powers and duties.7 The nondelegation 
doctrine expounds the idea that a legislature cannot delegate its 
lawmaking power to anyone else.8 The Florida Constitution combines 
both doctrines and states: “The powers of the state government shall 
be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person 
belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to 
                                                                                                                       
 5. 794 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), aff’d, 798 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). 
 6. 773 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). 
 7. For a detailed discussion of the separation of powers doctrine and its application, 
see generally Jack M. Beermann, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 467 (2011). 
 8. See Patrick M. Garry, Accommodating the Administrative State: The 
Interrelationship Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921, 
926-27 (2006). 
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either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein.”9 Thus, 
separation of powers and nondelegation are alive and well in  
Florida.10    
 These doctrines are frequently invoked in administrative law be-
cause agencies do not fit into the executive, legislative, or judicial 
branches of government; instead, they combine functions of all three 
branches.11 A strict view of separation of powers and nondelegation 
necessarily dictates that agencies are unconstitutional.12 The prob-
lem, however, is that agencies are necessary as a practical matter.13 
The issue then becomes how much power to delegate to agencies. 
Florida has traditionally attempted to put strong limitations on dele-
gation of authority to agencies, at least on paper. This Note focuses 
specifically on the legislature’s intent to limit agency rulemaking au-
thority, which is best exemplified in the history of the Florida Admin-
istrative Procedure Act itself.  
III.   HISTORY OF THE FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
 The Florida Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) was first en-
acted in 1961.14 The original APA provided few procedures for over-
                                                                                                                       
 9. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 10. This Note simply points out that Florida has expressly incorporated nondelegation 
into its Constitution. Scholars have hotly contested whether nondelegation is a viable 
concept in modern jurisprudence and, if it is, whether it should be. Garry, supra note 8, at 
938-39. Whether nondelegation is a viable, limiting principle on legislative grants of 
authority to agencies at the federal level is beyond the scope of this Note. See Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“[I]n our . . . complex society, replete with ever 
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability 
to delegate power under broad general directives.”). 
 11. See, e.g., FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(“[Agencies] have become a veritable fourth branch of the Government . . . . Courts have 
differed in assigning a place to these seemingly necessary bodies in our constitutional 
system.”); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and 
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 579 (1984) (“The theory of separation-of-powers 
breaks down when attempting to locate administrative and regulatory agencies within one of 
the three branches . . . .”). 
 12. See, e.g., Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. at 487-88 (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(“Administrative agencies have been called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or quasi-
judicial . . . in order to validate their functions within the separation-of-powers scheme of 
the Constitution. The mere retreat to the qualifying ‘quasi’ is implicit with confession that 
all recognized classifications have broken down, and ‘quasi’ is a smooth cover which we 
draw over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed.”). 
 13. F. Scott Boyd, Legislative Checks on Rulemaking Under Florida’s New APA, 24 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 309, 313 (1997) [hereinafter Boyd, Legislative Checks on Rulemaking] 
(“Legislation cannot be so specific that it anticipates every eventuality and addresses every 
detail. If government is to work, agencies must have latitude to ‘fill in the details’ of a 
statutory program. The power to adopt rules is not inherent in the executive branch, 
however; therefore, the Legislature must delegate this lawmaking power.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 14. See Cathy M. Sellers, Overview of the Administrative Procedure Act, in FLORIDA 
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 2.1 (10th ed. 2015), Westlaw ADP FL-CLE 2-1.  
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sight of agency decisions, which ultimately led to concerns in the leg-
islature about agency abuse of discretion.15 The 1974 revisions sought 
to curb “phantom government,” a term used to describe agency ac-
tions that exceed their delegated authority.16 Unfortunately, these 
amendments failed to live up to expectations.17 
 One of the major failures of the 1974 APA era was the courts’ 
wholesale importation of federal administrative law standards of re-
view. The standard of review that a court applies in a challenge to an 
agency rulemaking decision is important because it determines the 
level of deference that a court will give to the agency.18 The 1974 APA 
provided strict compartmentalization of the standard of review de-
pending on whether the court was deciding an issue of procedure, 
law, fact, or policy.19 It was up to the judge to figure out into which 
particular category an issue fell and apply the standard of review ac-
cordingly.20 However, the 1974 APA did not inform hearing officers  
of what standard of review to apply for rule challenges.21 Rather  
than look to the standards of review in the APA for guidance, the 
courts borrowed from federal decisions.22 By 1989, the Florida APA 
standards of review were not only hopelessly confused, but were also  
completely enveloped by the thorny mess of federal standards of re-
view that the legislature had expressly been attempting to avoid.23  
 So the legislature made substantial changes to the APA again in 
1996. Although the legislature has amended the APA every year 
since 1974 (with the exception of 2014), the 1996 APA is by far the 
most extensive revision of the Act. “The entire Act was reorganized 
and renumbered, opportunities to challenge proposed rules were ex-
                                                                                                                       
 15. F. Scott Boyd, Florida’s ALJs: Maintaining a Different Balance, 24 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN. L. JUDGES, 175, 205-06 (2004) (positing that increased complaints from citizens and 
public interest groups about agency abuse, such as “unlawful tax assessments, adoption of 
rules without statutory authority, and expansion of permitting requirements in direct 
contravention of . . . legislative intent,” was one of the factors that compelled the 
legislature to implement the 1974 overhaul of the APA). 
 16. F. Scott Boyd, A Traveler’s Guide for the Road to Reform, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
247, 257-58 (1994) [hereinafter Boyd, A Traveler’s Guide]; Boyd, Legislative Checks on 
Rulemaking, supra note 13, at 311; Martha C. Mann, Note, St. Johns River Water 
Management District v. Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co.: Defining Agency Rulemaking 
Authority Under the 1996 Revisions to the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, 26 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 517, 523 (1999). 
 17. Boyd, Legislative Checks on Rulemaking, supra note 13, at 311. 
 18. Boyd, A Traveler’s Guide, supra note 16, at 260.  
 19. Id. at 262 (“In overly simplistic terms, Florida’s Administrative Procedure Act 
require[d] strict review of the way an agency makes a decision [(procedure)], strict review 
over whether it is lawful [(law)], less strict review over whether it is right [(fact)], and 
virtually no review over whether it is smart [(policy)].”). 
 20. Id. at 261-62. 
 21. Id. at 262. 
 22. Id. at 263. 
 23. Id. at 263-70. 
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panded, waiver or variance was permitted, mediation and summary 
hearing procedures were created, and legislative oversight provisions 
were strengthened.”24 The 1996 APA furthered the legislature’s goal 
to curb phantom government.25 In particular, the legislature set forth 
limitations on agency rulemaking authority in section 120.52(8).26  
 Section 120.52(8) defines an invalid exercise of delegated legisla-
tive authority as an “action which goes beyond the powers, functions, 
and duties delegated by the Legislature.”27 After enumerating a list 
of conditions that qualify as invalid exercises of delegated legislative 
authority, the legislature included a “flush-left” paragraph that fur-
ther limited agency authority:  
A grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not sufficient to 
allow an agency to adopt a rule; a specific law to be implemented is 
also required. An agency may adopt only rules that implement, in-
terpret, or make specific the particular powers and duties granted 
by the enabling statute. No agency shall have authority to adopt a 
rule only because it is reasonably related to the purpose of the en-
abling legislation and is not arbitrary and capricious, nor shall an 
agency have the authority to implement statutory provisions set-
ting forth general legislative intent or policy. Statutory language 
granting rulemaking authority or generally describing the powers 
and functions of an agency shall be construed to extend no further 
than the particular powers and duties conferred by the same  
statute.28  
 Section 120.52(8) marked a substantial departure from the tradi-
tional practice of the courts to provide federal-level deference to agency 
actions. Unsurprisingly, the statutory provision quickly became the 
focus of litigation. The DCAs provided differing interpretations of the 
provision in three 1998 cases: Department of Business & Professional 
Regulation v. Calder Race Course, Inc.;29 St. Petersburg Kennel Club v. 
Department of Business & Professional Regulation;30 and St. Johns 
River Water Management District v. Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co.31 
Of the three, Consolidated-Tomoka is the most well-known because 
the legislature quickly invalidated the opinion’s reasoning in its 1999 
amendments to the APA.32 Since Calder Race Course adopted the rea-
                                                                                                                       
 24. Sellers, supra note 14. 
 25. See Boyd, Legislative Checks on Rulemaking, supra note 13, at 311-12. 
 26. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (1996).  
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. The term “flush-left” merely indicates that this paragraph is not a numbered 
provision of the statute; instead, the paragraph is justified “left” without any indentation.  
 29. 724 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). 
 30. 719 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). 
 31. 717 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). 
 32. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (1999). 
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soning of Consolidated-Tomoka in its analysis,33 only St. Petersburg 
Kennel Club and Consolidated-Tomoka are discussed below. 
A.   St. Petersburg Kennel Club v. Department of  
Business & Professional Regulation 
 St. Petersburg Kennel Club invalidated Florida Administrative 
Code Rule 61D-11.026, which was promulgated by the Division of 
Pari-Mutuel Wagering (“Division”) to define what qualified as a game 
of “poker.”34 During its rule challenge, St. Petersburg Kennel Club 
had argued that the rule was an invalid exercise of delegated legisla-
tive authority.35 The Division argued that four statutory provisions 
gave it the authority to implement the rule: sections 849.085(2)(a), 
550.0251(12), 849.086(2)(a), and 849.086(4).36 First, section 
849.085(2)(a) authorized a list of “penny-ante games,” including pok-
er, so long as a player did not win more than ten dollars “in a single 
round, hand, or game.”37 Second, section 550.0251(12) authorized the 
Division “to enforce and to carry out the provisions of [section] 
849.086.”38 Third, section 849.086(2)(a) required that the penny-ante 
games be “played in a non-banking manner.”39 Finally, section 
849.086(4) authorized the Division to adopt rules relating to “the op-
eration of a cardroom.”40 
 The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) agreed with the Division. He 
found that sections 550.0251(12) and 849.086(4) gave the Division 
the authority to implement sections 849.085(2)(a) and 849.086(2)(a).41 
The Second DCA, however, invalidated the rule.42 The court deter-
mined that the statutes in dispute did not delegate the specific au-
                                                                                                                       
 33. Calder Race Course, 724 So. 2d at 104-05. 
 34. St. Petersburg Kennel Club, 719 So. 2d at 1211. 
 35. St. Petersburg Kennel Club v. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Case No. 97-
2080RP, 1997 WL 1053339, at *10 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings Aug. 19, 1997), rev’d, 719 
So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).  
 36. St. Petersburg Kennel Club, 1997 WL 1053339, at *8-9. 
 37. FLA. STAT. § 849.085(2)(a) (1995); see also St. Petersburg Kennel Club, 1997 WL 
1053339, at *9.  
 38. FLA. STAT. § 550.0251(12) (1996); see also St. Petersburg Kennel Club, 1997 WL 
1053339, at *8.  
 39. FLA. STAT. § 849.086(2)(a) (1996); see also St. Petersburg Kennel Club, 1997 WL 
1053339, at *9. 
 40. § 849.086(4); see also St. Petersburg Kennel Club, 1997 WL 1053339, at *9. 
 41. St. Petersburg Kennel Club, 1997 WL 1053339, at *9. 
 42. St. Petersburg Kennel Club v. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 719 So. 2d 1210, 
1212 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Interestingly, St. Petersburg Kennel Club never cited 
Consolidated-Tomoka, even though Consolidated-Tomoka was first in time. See infra 
Section III.B. St. Petersburg Kennel Club is a narrower interpretation of section 120.52(8) 
and is perhaps more in line with the restrictions on rulemaking authority that the 
legislature intended in 1996 and reiterated in 1999.  
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thority “to make rules which set forth the definition of poker.”43  
Instead, the Division’s rulemaking authority included “the issuance 
of cardroom and employee licenses for cardroom operations; operation 
of a cardroom; recordkeeping and reporting requirements; and the 
collection of all fees and taxes imposed by [section 849.086(4)(a)].”44 
The Division was also authorized “to make . . . rules relating to card-
room operations, to enforce and carry out the provisions of [section] 
849.086, and to regulate the authorized cardroom activities in the 
state.”45 None of these statutes specifically gave the Division the au-
thority to define poker, so the court invalidated the existing rule as 
an invalid exercise of rulemaking authority.46 
B.   St. Johns River Water Management District v.  
Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co.  
 In Consolidated-Tomoka, the First DCA reversed the ALJ’s final 
order, which had declared a series of proposed rules set forth by St. 
Johns River Water Management District (the “District”) invalid.47 
The proposed rules allowed the District to regulate two additional 
hydrologic basins within its borders, the Spruce Creek and Tomoka 
River Hydrologic Basins, by expanding the breadth of the existing 
rules.48 Property owners affected by the rules challenged their validi-
ty.49 On appeal, the court focused on whether the rules were an inva-
lid exercise of legislative authority under either section 120.52(8)(b) 
or section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes.50 These statutory provisions 
state that a proposed rule is an invalid exercise of legislative authori-
ty if “[t]he agency has exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority” or 
if “[t]he rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions 
of law implemented,” respectively.51 Section 120.52(8) also includes a 
list of what does not constitute a valid grant of rulemaking authority. 
                                                                                                                       
 43. St. Petersburg Kennel Club, 719 So. 2d at 1211.  
 44. Id.; see also § 849.086(4)(a). 
 45. FLA. STAT. § 550.021(12) (1996); see also St. Petersburg Kennel Club, 719 So. 2d  
at 1211. 
 46. St. Petersburg Kennel Club, 719 So. 2d at 1211; cf. Fla. Elections Comm’n v. Blair, 
52 So. 3d 9, 14-15 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (finding that the Commission had authority to 
define the term “willful” because it was “a necessary component” in the Commission’s 
fulfillment of its duties).  
 47. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Consol.-Tomoka Land Co., 717 So. 2d 72, 75 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1998). 
 48. Id. There were four proposed changes: (i) a “recharge standard,” which required 
that three inches of runoff “be retained within a specified area of the Tomoka River and 
Spruce Creek Basins”; (ii) “criteria for floodplain storage”; (iii) specifications for the types of 
storm water systems that could be used and how they could be constructed; and (iv) a 
“wildlife habitat protection zone.” Id. 
 49. Id. at 75-76.  
 50. Id. at 77. 
 51. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8)(b)-(c) (1996).  
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In particular, it states: “An agency may adopt only rules that imple-
ment, interpret, or make specific the particular powers and duties 
granted by the enabling statute.”52  The First DCA found the term 
“particular” ambiguous.53 “Particular” could either mean (1) “that the 
powers and duties conferred on the agency must be identified by 
some defining characteristic,” or (2) “that they must be described in 
detail.”54 The court determined that in section 120.52(8), “particular” 
had to mean that rulemaking authority was restricted “to subjects 
that are directly within the class of powers and duties identified in 
the enabling statute. [Section 120.52(8)] was not designed to require 
a minimum level of detail in the statutory language used to describe 
the powers and duties.”55 
 At first glance, the court’s interpretation is intuitive. Enabling 
statutes passed by the legislature will invariably be more general 
than the rules that an agency is authorized to implement.56 The legis-
lature granted agencies the ability to “implement, interpret, or make 
specific the particular powers and duties granted by the enabling 
statute.”57 If agencies have the power to enact rules that are more 
specific than the enabling statute, it necessarily follows that “particu-
lar,” as it is used in section 120.52(8), cannot be synonymous with 
“detailed.” It would not be logical for the legislature to authorize 
agencies to adopt rules that are more specific than the enabling stat-
ute on the one hand but forbid them from enacting rules precisely be-
cause the enabling statute is general on the other. As the court 
states, “the Legislature could not have meant to condition rulemak-
ing authority on the existence of a statute describing in detail the 
subject of each potential rule.”58  
 The idea that “particular” could not mean “detailed” also makes 
sense from a practical standpoint. Regardless of one’s view of agen-
cies and their constitutionality, agencies are meant to do what the 
legislature does not have time to do59 (or, more cynically, what the 
legislature does not want to do for fear of political reprisal).60 If a 
                                                                                                                       
 52. § 120.52(8) (emphasis added). For the full flush-left paragraph, see supra pp. 1082.  
 53. Consol.-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 79. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 80. 
 57. Id. at 77 (emphasis added).  
 58. Id. at 80. 
 59. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (finding that at the 
federal level, Congress needs to delegate power to agencies in order to do its job).  
 60. See, e.g., Boyd, Legislative Checks on Rulemaking, supra note 13, at 347 (listing 
avoidance of political accountability as a factor that could influence the legislature to draft 
statutes broadly so that “they can then blame agencies for unacceptable results”); David 
Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers That Be: The Constitutional Purposes of 
the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 370 (1987) (“[D]elegation encourages bad 
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statute is detailed to the point of “describing . . . the subject of each 
potential rule,”61 the need for the agency is substantially dimin-
ished.62 The statute could stand complete on its own.  
 Given that it makes sense from an intuitive and practical stand-
point that agencies need a little wiggle room in their statutory lan-
guage, the question then becomes whether the First DCA’s interpre-
tation of “particular” was correct. The ALJ concluded that “particu-
lar” could mean “detailed,” and by extension, “detailed” had to mean 
“enumerated.”63 The court disagreed.64 Since the legislature could not 
possibly have meant for its enabling statutes to be so highly detailed, 
it stood to reason “particular” must have meant a “class of powers 
and duties identified in the enabling statute.”65  
 There was a third option. “Particular” can mean “of, relating to, or 
being a single person or thing.”66 So “particular” has two different 
connotations: “relating to . . . a single person or thing,” or “being a 
single person or thing.” The dictionary that the First DCA cited pro-
vides this example: “the particular person I had in mind.”67 While the 
court focused on the “relating to” aspect of “particular” when formu-
lating its class of powers and duties analysis, the dictionary example 
emphasized the “single person or thing” aspect of the definition. In 
this sense of the word, the phrase “implement, interpret, or make 
specific the particular powers and duties granted by the enabling 
statute” can be interpreted to mean “implement, interpret, or make 
specific the [individual, identified] powers and duties granted by the 
enabling statute.”68 This interpretation does not require the enabling 
                                                                                                                       
laws because members of Congress do not have to take responsibility for the rules of 
conduct that eventually emerge from the delegation process.”). 
 61. Consol.-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 80. 
 62. See Boyd, Legislative Checks on Rulemaking, supra note 13, at 313 (“Legislation 
cannot be so specific that it anticipates every eventuality and addresses every detail. If 
government is to work, agencies must have latitude to ‘fill in the details’ of a statutory 
program.”). 
 63. Consol.-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 79. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 847 (10th ed. 1996)); see 
also Particular, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/particular 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2016).  
 67. Consol.-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 79 (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 847 (10th ed. 1996)). 
 68. One could also read the statute to say, “implement, interpret, or make specific the 
[specified] powers and duties granted by the enabling statute.” This interpretation also 
captures the “single person or thing” aspect of the definition of “particular.” This rendition, 
however, presents the same problem in that “specified” can also be defined to mean 
“detailed.” The term “specify” means “to name or state explicitly or in detail.” Specify, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/specify (last visited Feb. 
9, 2016). When using the definition, “to state . . . in detail,” one ends up with an 
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statute to be highly detailed in listing the agency’s authorized duties 
and powers; rather, it simply requires that the statute actually iden-
tify what the agency’s duties and powers are.  
 The difference between the three options just described is in the 
degree of specificity required to satisfy section 120.52(8). To illus-
trate, imagine that your friend is trying to find someone in a particu-
lar Starbucks, and you are describing that person to your friend. Un-
der the first option (which was rejected by the First DCA), you would 
have to describe everything about that person with exactitude in or-
der to identify him accurately: hair, eye color, height, clothing, the 
precise location of the person in the Starbucks, the GPS coordinates 
for the Starbucks, etc. Under the second option—the “class of powers 
and duties” analysis that the First DCA chose—you would sufficient-
ly identify the person if you gave a general description of the individ-
ual but failed to tell your friend that the person was in a Starbucks. 
As long as your description matched that of the person your friend 
found in the Einstein’s down the street, you would satisfy the class of 
powers and duties analysis. Under the third option, you would still be 
able to give a general description of the person, thus avoiding the ex-
acting requirements of option one, but you would still have to tell 
your friend that the person was in “X” Starbucks. On a sliding scale, 
the first option requires the most specificity, the class of powers and 
duties option requires the least, and the third option is somewhere in 
the middle.  
 It is not clear why the court chose the class of powers and duties 
analysis over the third option. Both definitions are equally reasona-
ble. But the choice between the two options is incredibly important in 
section 120.52(8) cases because it underlies the central question: 
Does the language of the enumerating statute provide the agency 
with the power to promulgate rules in a particular situation? The an-
swer to the question decides the case. By settling on the class of pow-
ers and duties analysis, the court gave agencies the broadest possible 
rulemaking authority. This would seem to suggest that the decision 
of Consolidated-Tomoka was motivated by a desire to take some of 
the teeth out of the 1996 Amendments and harmonize them with the 
Florida courts’ pre-1996 practice of allowing agencies broad rulemak-
ing authority.69 Or perhaps the court only considered the “relating to” 
aspect of the definition of “particular.” Regardless, the legislature 
disagreed with the First DCA’s interpretation of the 1996 Amend-
ments and immediately altered the statutory language in 1999.  
                                                                                                                       
interpretation of the statute that requires the enabling statute to list the powers and 
duties granted to agencies in detail. 
 69. Boyd, A Traveler’s Guide, supra note 16, at 264-70 (discussing wholesale 
importation of federal standards of review into Florida courts after the 1974 amendments).  
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IV.   THE 1999 APA 
 The legislature made three important changes to section 120.52(8) 
in 1999—at least for the purposes of this Note.70 Each of these chang-
es addresses—and reverses—the Consolidated-Tomoka analysis. 
Where the 1996 APA stated that “[a]n agency may adopt only rules 
that implement, interpret, or make specific the particular powers and 
duties granted by the enabling statute,”71 the 1999 APA states, “An 
agency may adopt only rules that implement or interpret the specific 
powers and duties granted by the enabling statute.”72 The 1999 APA 
specifically added a clause invalidating the reasoning of Consolidat-
ed-Tomoka:  
No agency shall have authority to adopt a rule only because it is 
reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation and is 
not arbitrary and capricious or is within the agency's class of pow-
ers and duties, nor shall an agency have the authority to imple-
ment statutory provisions setting forth general legislative intent or 
policy.73  
 Finally, the legislature replaced the term “particular” with the 
more restrictive adjective, “specific.” The 1996 APA stated that 
“[s]tatutory language granting rulemaking authority or generally de-
scribing the powers and functions of an agency shall be construed to 
extend no further than the particular powers and duties conferred by 
the same statute.”74 In contrast, the 1999 APA states, “Statutory lan-
guage granting rulemaking authority or generally describing the 
powers and functions of an agency shall be construed to extend no 
further than implementing or interpreting the specific powers and 
duties conferred by the same statute.”75    
V.   RESPONSE OF THE FLORIDA COURTS  
TO THE 1999 AMENDMENTS 
 Two First DCA cases interpreted the 1999 amendments to the 
APA soon after their enactment: Southwest Florida Water Manage-
ment District v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc.76 and Board of Trustees 
of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Day Cruise Ass’n.77 The 
                                                                                                                       
 70. The 1999 version of section 120.52(8) has remained unchanged in the current 
version of the statute. Compare FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (2015), with FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) 
(1999).  
 71. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (1996) (emphasis added). 
 72. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (1999) (emphasis added). 
 73. Id. (emphasis added). 
 74. § 120.52(8) (1996) (emphasis added).  
 75. § 120.52(8) (1999) (emphasis added). 
 76. 773 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). 
 77. 794 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), aff’d, 798 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). 
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cases were decided within a year of each other (2000 and 2001, re-
spectively). Save the Manatee Club largely consists of a truncated 
version of the Consolidated-Tomoka analysis, with minor adjust-
ments to conform the opinion to the 1999 amendments. Day Cruise, 
on the other hand, closely analyzes the 1999 version of section 
120.52(8). However, it is Save the Manatee Club that has come to 
dominate Florida court opinions on rulemaking challenges and not 
the more detailed Day Cruise analysis.78 The following Sections will 
discuss the facts of the two cases, examine the differences between 
their analyses of section 120.52(8), and finally conclude with an opin-
ion on which analysis is better to apply in section 120.52(8) rulemak-
ing challenges. 
A.   Southwest Florida Water Management District v.  
Save the Manatee Club, Inc. 
 After the legislature amended the APA, the First DCA analyzed 
the statutory language of section 120.52(8) again in Southwest Flori-
da Water Management District v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc.79 Save 
the Manatee Club concerned the Southwest Florida Water Manage-
ment District’s (the “District’s”) authority to create exemptions to en-
vironmental resource permitting requirements.80 South Shores Part-
ners, Ltd. (“South Shores”) applied “for a permit to develop a 720-acre 
tract of land in Southwest Hillsborough County.”81 As part of the de-
velopment project, South Shores wanted “to build a connecting wa-
terway between the [existing] canal system [on the property] and the 
[Tampa] Bay.”82 The Save the Manatee Club believed that the result-
ing increase in power boat traffic in this new waterway would “en-
danger the manatee and its habitat.”83 
 The District has the authority to grant either a general permit or 
an environmental resource permit to a development project, depend-
ing on the type of project involved.84 When granting an environmen-
tal resource permit, the District must consider “[t]he impact a pro-
posed development will have on wildlife” as a factor; it does not have 
to do so when it grants a general permit.85 The District granted South 
                                                                                                                       
 78. As of December 14, 2015, a search of the “Citing References” on WestLaw shows 
that Save the Manatee Club has been cited by forty court opinions. Day Cruise, by 
comparison, has been cited by fifteen court opinions. These numbers do not include 
citations to either case in DOAH decisions.  
 79. 773 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). 
 80. Id. at 596. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id. 
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Shores a general permit instead of an environmental resource per-
mit.86 The District claimed that it had the rulemaking authority to 
exempt South Shores from the environmental resource permitting 
requirements because of “grandfather provisions” contained in rule 
40D-4.051, Florida Administrative Code, sections (3), (5), and (6).87 
The rule allowed the District to exempt development projects from 
environmental resource permitting requirements if the development 
had been approved prior to October 1, 1984.88  
 Save the Manatee Club challenged the grandfather provisions of 
the rule as an invalid exercise of rulemaking authority.89 It argued 
that section 373.414(9), which allows the District to “establish ex-
emptions and general permits,”90 did not authorize the District to ex-
empt developments from “permitting requirements based solely on 
prior governmental approval.”91 The First DCA agreed and found 
that the grandfather provisions were an invalid exercise of legislative 
authority because they did not “implement or interpret a specific 
power or duty conferred by statute.”92  
B.   Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement  
Trust Fund v. Day Cruise Ass’n 
 Day Cruise was decided less than a year after Save the Manatee 
Club.93 The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust 
Fund (“Trustees”) proposed a rule that would forbid “cruises to no-
where,” in which cruise ships (i) are anchored or moored to sovereign-
ty submerged lands or (ii) simply pass through waters under the ju-
risdiction of another state or a foreign country without stopping any-
where.94 The primary purpose of a “cruise to nowhere” is to allow 
passengers to “gamble (legally) on the high seas.”95 The Trustees cit-
ed sections 253.03(7), 253.001, 253.03, 253.04, and 253.77, Florida 
Statutes (1999), as well as article X, section 11 of the Florida Consti-
tution, “as the ‘statutes’ the proposed rule would implement.”96 The 
                                                                                                                       
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 596-97.  
 90. FLA. STAT. § 373.414(9) (1999). 
 91. Save the Manatee Club, 773 So. 2d at 597. 
 92. Id. at 600. 
 93. State, Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Day Cruise Ass’n, 794 
So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), aff’d, 798 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). 
 94. Day Cruise, 794 So. 2d at 697.  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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First DCA found the proposed rule to be an invalid exercise of dele-
gated legislative authority that violated sections 120.52(8)(b) and (c) 
of the 1999 Florida Statutes.97  
 Despite the fact that Day Cruise was written less than a year after 
Save the Manatee Club, it only mentioned Save the Manatee Club 
once. And it cited the opinion merely to address the legislature’s in-
validation of Consolidated-Tomoka, not to use it as guidance for in-
terpreting section 120.52(8).98 The Day Cruise majority avoided Save 
the Manatee Club when promulgating its own analysis of the 1999 
version of section 120.52(8).99 The noticeable lack of citation to a re-
cent—and precedential—First DCA case is unusual. Thus, it is im-
portant to discuss Day Cruise’s interpretation of section 120.52(8) 
and how that interpretation differs from Save the Manatee Club. 
C.   Save the Manatee Club and Day Cruise—A Comparison 
 A quick glance at Day Cruise shows that the Day Cruise majority 
underwent a much more thorough analysis of the statutory language 
of the 1999 amendments to section 120.52(8) than Save the Manatee 
Club. Both cases addressed the impact that the legislature’s amend-
ments to section 120.52(8) would have on rulemaking authority chal-
lenges. For ease of reference, the following table illustrates the dif-

















                                                                                                                       
 97. Id. at 704. Section 120.52(8)(b) invalidates a rule if the agency exceeds its grant of 
rulemaking authority, and section 120.52(8)(c) invalidates a rules that “enlarges, modifies, 
or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented.” FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8)(b)-(c) 
(1999).  
 98. See Day Cruise, 794 So. 2d at 699. 
 99. The concurrence and dissent both cited Save the Manatee Club in their opinions. 
See id. at 705-06 (Browning, J., concurring; Allen, C.J., dissenting). 
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FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (1996) (em-
phasis added). 
FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (1999) (em-
phasis added). 
 
A grant of rulemaking authority is 
necessary but not sufficient to allow 
an agency to adopt a rule; a specific 
law to be implemented is also re-
quired. An agency may adopt only 
rules that implement, interpret or 
make specific the particular 
powers and duties granted by 
the enabling statute. No agency 
shall have authority to adopt a rule 
only because it is reasonably related 
to the purpose of the enabling legis-
lation and is not arbitrary and capri-
cious, nor shall an agency have the 
authority to implement statutory 
provisions setting forth general leg-
islative intent or policy. Statutory 
language granting rulemaking au-
thority or generally describing the 
powers and functions of an agency 
shall be construed to extend no fur-
ther than the particular powers 




A grant of rulemaking authority is 
necessary but not sufficient to allow 
an agency to adopt a rule; a specific 
law to be implemented is also re-
quired. An agency may adopt only 
rules that implement or interpret 
the specific powers and duties 
granted by the enabling statute. 
No agency shall have authority to 
adopt a rule only because it is rea-
sonably related to the purpose of the 
enabling legislation and is not arbi-
trary and capricious or is within 
the agency's class of powers and 
duties, nor shall an agency have the 
authority to implement statutory 
provisions setting forth general legis-
lative intent or policy. Statutory lan-
guage granting rulemaking authority 
or generally describing the powers 
and functions of an agency shall be 
construed to extend no further than 
implementing or interpreting 
the specific powers and duties con-
ferred by the enabling statute. 
 
 1.   The Save the Manatee Club Analysis 
 Save the Manatee Club addressed the differences between the 
1996 and 1999 versions of section 120.52(8) collectively. The court 
started with the simple statement, “[T]he Legislature has rejected 
the standard we adopted in Consolidated-Tomoka.”100 It then trun-
cated its analysis in two ways. First, it found the language of section 
120.52(8) that limits rulemaking authority to “rules that implement 
or interpret specific powers and duties granted by the enabling stat-
ute . . . clear and unambiguous.”101 Second, it referred the reader back 
to Consolidated-Tomoka for a full analysis of why the term “specific” 
in the 1999 APA did not mean “detailed,” just as the term “particu-
                                                                                                                       
 100. Sw. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc., 773 So. 2d 594, 599 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2000). 
 101. Id. 
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lar” in the 1996 APA did not mean “detailed.”102 Thus, Save the Man-
atee Club should be read in conjunction with Consolidated-Tomoka.     
 The most important portion of the Save the Manatee Club decision 
boils down to a single statement:  
[T]he authority for an administrative rule is not a matter of de-
gree. The question is whether the statute contains a specific grant 
of legislative authority for the rule, not whether the grant of au-
thority is specific enough. Either the enabling statue authorizes 
the rule at issue or it does not.103  
 At first glance, this quotation seems straightforward. But things 
are not quite so simple, because the statement’s meaning depends on 
Consolidated-Tomoka.  
 When read in a vacuum, the quote actually becomes nonsensical 
because it dismisses the very essence of rulemaking authority chal-
lenges. Save the Manatee Club states that the enabling statute either 
authorizes the challenged rule or it does not, as if statutory language 
is always clear enough to provide this binary switch. This is simply 
not the case.104 Rulemaking authority challenges arise precisely due 
to a fight over “whether the grant of authority is specific enough.”105 
As one scholar put it: 
[I]f it were possible to devise a clear test to determine the point at 
which an agency exceeds delegated authority, such a test would 
have been discovered long ago. A new, more restrictive grant of 
delegated authority is unlikely to be much easier to define. A stat-
utory intent to delegate less may be clear, but the problems inher-
ent in determining exactly where the boundary lies will undoubt-
edly remain.106   
 So what exactly did the First DCA mean? It was referring to Con-
solidated-Tomoka’s analysis of the term “particular.” Specifically, the 
First DCA was referring to its dismissal of an interpretation that 
treated the word “particular” as synonymous with “detailed.”107 The 
problem with interpreting “particular” to mean “detailed”108 is that an 
enabling statute will inevitably be more general than the rule pro-
duced by the agency.109 Save the Manatee Club reiterated this princi-
ple: “A rule that is used to implement or carry out a directive will 
                                                                                                                       
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Boyd, Legislative Checks on Rulemaking, supra note 13, at 345-47 (listing 
pressures that the legislature faces that encourage broad drafting rather than specificity).   
 105. Save the Manatee Club, 773 So. 2d at 599. 
 106. Boyd, Legislative Checks on Rulemaking, supra note 13, at 318. 
 107. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Consol.-Tomoka Land Co., 717 So. 2d 72, 79 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1998).  
 108. See supra Section III.B. 
 109. See Consol.-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 80. 
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necessarily contain language more detailed than that used in the di-
rective itself. . . . There would be no need for interpretation if all of 
the details were contained in the statute itself.”110  
 Thus, when read in context, Save the Manatee Club’s statement 
seems to be a reiteration of the First DCA’s previous admonition to 
courts not to interpret the word “specific” in section 120.52(8) as the 
equivalent of the word “detailed.” Perhaps a clearer statement would 
have been, “The question is whether the statue contains a specific 
grant of legislative authority for the rule, not whether the grant of 
authority is [detailed] enough.” If the quote is read without Consoli-
dated-Tomoka’s focus, however, the quote invites judges to avoid in-
validating vague, overbroad grants of authority, because to do  
otherwise would be to ask whether the grant of authority is  
“specific enough.”111  
 2.   The Day Cruise Analysis 
 After citing the much-discussed “flush left” paragraph, the Day 
Cruise majority stated:   
Under the 1996 and 1999 amendments to the APA, it is now clear, 
agencies have rulemaking authority only where the Legislature 
has enacted a specific statute, and authorized the agency to im-
plement it, and then only if the (proposed) rule implements or in-
terprets specific powers or duties, as opposed to improvising in an 
area that can be said to fall only generally within some class of 
powers or duties the Legislature has conferred on the agency.112 
 This passage breaks down into three questions that determine 
whether the agency has exceeded its rulemaking authority: first, 
whether the legislature enacted a specific statute; second, whether 
the legislature authorized the agency to implement the statute; and 
finally, whether the “(proposed) rule implements . . . specific powers 
or duties, as opposed to improvising in an area that can be said to fall 
only generally within some class of powers or duties the Legislature 
has conferred on the agency.”113 
 The court emphasized that the legislature’s recent amendments 
“to clarify significant restrictions on agencies’ exercise of rulemaking 
authority, and to reject the ‘class of powers and duties’ analysis em-
ployed in Consolidated-Tomoka” were central to its interpretation of 
section 120.52(8).114 The court retained this focus when applying the 
                                                                                                                       
 110. Save the Manatee Club, 773 So. 2d at 599.  
 111. Id. 
 112. State, Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Day Cruise Ass’n, 794 
So. 2d 696, 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (footnote omitted).  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 700-01 (footnote omitted).  
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new language of section 120.52(8) to sections 253.03(7), 253.001, 
253.03, 253.04, and 253.77, Florida Statues (1999), as well as article 
X, section 11, Florida Constitution, the “statutes” that the Trustees 
claimed granted them the necessary authority to promulgate the 
proposed rule.115 The proposed rule in this case was “to preclude the 
use of sovereign submerged lands for mooring gambling vessels or 
boats transporting passengers to or from gambling vessels.”116  
 The court first looked at sections 253.03(7)(a) and (b) to see if 
these statutes granted the Trustees the requisite rulemaking author-
ity for the proposed rule. Section 253.03(7)(a) authorized the Trustees 
to “creat[e] . . . an overall and comprehensive plan of development 
concerning the acquisition, management, and disposition of state-
owned lands so as to ensure maximum benefit and use.”117 Since this 
statutory grant of authority said nothing about the Trustees’ authori-
ty to promulgate rules concerning submerged lands, the court deter-
mined that this statute did not confer the required rulemaking au-
thority to promulgate the proposed rule.118  
 Section 253.03(7)(b) was even less helpful to the Trustees, because 
this statutory provision limited the Trustees’ rulemaking authority to 
certain regulations. The Trustees were only able to promulgate rules 
concerning the use of sovereignty-submerged land by vessels that in-
volved “regulations for anchoring, mooring, or otherwise attaching to 
the bottom; the establishment of anchorages; and the discharge of 
sewage, pumpout requirements, and facilities associated with an-
chorages.”119 Additionally, the Trustees were prohibited from adopt-
ing rules that “interfere[d] with commerce or the transitory operation 
of vessels through navigable water.”120 The court determined through 
standard statutory construction methods that the restrictions of sec-
tion 253.03(7)(b) limited the broad grant of authority provided in sec-
tion 253.03(7)(a).121 It also determined that the proposed rule exceed-
ed the Trustees’ rulemaking authority because the proposed rule had 
nothing do with regulating anchoring or mooring; instead, it had eve-
rything to do with prohibiting perfectly legal commerce.122 Thus, the 
Trustees had exceeded their rulemaking authority in violation of sec-
tion 120.52(8)(b).     
                                                                                                                       
 115. Id. at 697.  
 116. Id. at 701. 
 117. FLA. STAT. § 253.03(7)(a) (1999).  
 118. Day Cruise, 794 So. 2d at 701. 
 119. § 253.03(7)(b). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Day Cruise, 794 So. 2d at 701-02 (finding that section 253.03(7)(b), the more 
specific statutory provision, controlled the more general section 253.03(7)(a) provision 
because both provisions covered the same subject matter). 
 122. Id. at 702. 
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 The court then analyzed sections 253.03 and 253.04, Florida Stat-
utes (1999), and article X, section 11 of the Florida Constitution to 
see if they provided a specific law that the Trustees were authorized 
to implement, interpret, or make specific.123 It stressed that, based on 
the new statutory language of the 1999 APA, “a general grant [of au-
thority] is sufficient to allow an agency to adopt a rule only when re-
lied upon in conjunction with a specific provision of law to be imple-
mented.”124 Unsurprisingly, the majority in Day Cruise found that 
these statutes did not direct the Trustees to implement rules about 
the day cruise industry.125 “No provision listed as being implemented 
by the proposed rule purports to authorize—much less specifically to 
direct—the Trustees to prohibit only certain vessels from mooring on 
the basis of lawful activities on board (possibly other) vessels once 
they are on the high seas.”126  
 3.   Are Save the Manatee Club and Day Cruise Really in Accord? 
 The Trustees filed a motion for clarification, rehearing, certifica-
tion, or rehearing en banc, arguing that the Day Cruise decision con-
flicted with Save the Manatee Club. The First DCA denied the mo-
tion, stating that its decision was “fully consonant” with Save the 
Manatee Club.127 The court then quoted the well-known statement 
from Save the Manatee Club:  
The question is whether the statute contains a specific grant of 
legislative authority for the rule, not whether the grant of authori-
ty is specific enough. Either the enabling statute authorizes the 
rule at issue or it does not. . . . [T]his question is one that must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.128  
 And in this particular case, when the effect of the rule would be to 
outlaw an entire industry, the First DCA reaffirmed its decision that 
the legislature would have to provide that power to the Trustees  
specifically.129        
 The First DCA’s support of Save the Manatee Club in Day Cruise 
established that the two decisions were not in conflict. In fact, the 
cases are sometimes cited together as support for the principle that 
                                                                                                                       
 123. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8)(c) (1999) (invalidating a rule that “enlarges, modifies, 
or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented”).  
 124. Day Cruise, 794 So. 2d at 703 (quoting Boyd, Legislative Checks on Rulemaking, 
supra note 13, at 339). 
 125. Id. at 703-04. 
 126. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 127. State, Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Day Cruise Ass’n, 798 
So. 2d 847, 847 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). 
 128. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Sw. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Save the 
Manatee Club, Inc., 773 So. 2d 594, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)).  
 129. Id. at 847-48. 
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the enabling statute must have a specific grant of authority in order 
for the agency to have rulemaking authority.130 However, this Note 
argues that Day Cruise did not actually stand for the same proposi-
tion that Save the Manatee Club did—namely, that a statute did not 
have to be “detailed” in order to meet the specificity requirement of 
section 120.52(8).  
 Although the second Day Cruise opinion quoted Save the Manatee 
Club’s “specific enough” language when it denied the Trustees’ mo-
tion, its following explanation was actually centered on the sentence, 
“[e]ither the enabling statute authorizes the rule at issue or it does 
not.”131 The majority in the first Day Cruise opinion found that there 
was absolutely no statutory language that would have given the 
Trustees the authority to effectively outlaw a whole industry.132 
There was no need to delve into the question of whether the authori-
ty granted was “specific enough.” Thus, the court’s statement that its 
Day Cruise opinion was “fully consonant” with Save the Manatee 
Club is only true to the extent that both decisions require that there 
actually be a statutory provision allegedly granting the rulemaking 
authority in question.  
 This Note’s argument is “fully consonant” with the language of the 
original Day Cruise opinion. As quoted above, Day Cruise essentially 
set forth three questions to ask when considering a section 120.52(8) 
rulemaking challenge: first, whether the legislature enacted a specif-
ic statute; second, whether the legislature authorized the agency to 
implement the statute; and finally, whether the “(proposed) rule im-
plements . . . specific powers or duties, as opposed to improvising in 
an area that can be said to fall only generally within some class of 
powers or duties the Legislature has conferred on the agency.”133 The 
first two questions ask generally whether there is rulemaking au-
thority; if there is not, the agency has exceeded its rulemaking au-
thority in violation of section 120.52(8)(b). The third question asks 
whether the agency has exceeded the rulemaking authority delegated 
to it in questions one and two, which is prohibited by section 
120.52(8)(c) and the flush-left paragraph. 
 Day Cruise never reached question three, because it found that 
the legislature had not delegated the Trustees the authority to wipe 
                                                                                                                       
 130. See, e.g., United Faculty of Fla. v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ., 157 So. 3d 514, 517 (Fla. 
1st DCA 2015); Fla. Elections Comm’n v. Blair, 52 So. 3d 9, 12 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Lamar 
Outdoor Advert.–Lakeland v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 17 So. 3d 799, 801-02 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2009); Florida v. I.B., 891 So. 2d 1168, 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).  
 131. Day Cruise Ass’n, 798 So. 2d at 847 (quoting Sw. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Save 
the Manatee Club, 773 So. 2d 594, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)).  
 132. See State, Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Day Cruise Ass’n, 
794 So. 2d 696, 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). 
 133. Id. at 700. 
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out an entire industry.134 If the authority to implement the rule does 
not exist in the first place, there is no logical reason to continue the 
analysis and ask whether the grant of authority was specific. Save 
the Manatee Club, on the other hand, reached the third question be-
cause it determined that the agency had tried to implement a power 
that did not exist within its specific grant of delegated authority.135 
So Save the Manatee Club and Day Cruise are in accord only to the 
extent that they both require a statute to grant specific authority to 
an agency; otherwise, the analysis in the two opinions is entirely  
different.   
 4.   There Are Two Different Rulemaking Authority Analyses—
Which Is Better? 
 As discussed above, the analyses of Save the Manatee Club and 
Day Cruise are substantively different, even if facially they appear 
the same. These two different analytical paths raise the question of 
which one to take. This Note argues that the courts should follow 
Day Cruise’s analysis rather than Save the Manatee Club’s analysis. 
Day Cruise undergoes a thorough analysis of section 120.52(8) that 
remains true to the text of the statute and also adheres to the legisla-
ture’s intent to restrict agency rulemaking authority. Save the Mana-
tee Club, on the other hand, is a truncated analysis that relies  
exclusively on a case whose reasoning was invalidated by the legisla-
ture. While there is nothing wrong with the analysis of Save the 
Manatee Club, the very nature of its truncated analysis subjects it to  
misinterpretation.  
 In fact, this is exactly what has happened with Save the Manatee 
Club’s “specific enough” quote. Courts have taken the quote at its 
face value, without interpreting it with Consolidated-Tomoka in 
mind. If the quote is read without a consideration of Consolidated-
Tomoka, the statement gives judges the opportunity to sustain 
vague, overbroad grants of authority.136 In short, the focus in Day 
Cruise is on the restrictions on rulemaking authority set out in sec-
tion 120.52(8); the focus in Save the Manatee Club is on the relation-
ship between the alleged grant of statutory authority and the prom-
ulgated rule, with the guidelines set out in section 120.52(8) second-
ary to the analysis. This is best exemplified in United Faculty of Flor-
ida v. Florida State Board of Education, which arguably returns to 
                                                                                                                       
 134. See id. at 704.  
 135. Save the Manatee Club, 773 So. 2d at 600 (“[W]e conclude that the disputed 
sections of [the] rule . . . are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because 
they do not implement or interpret any specific power or duty granted in the  
applicable . . . statute. . . . Because section 373.414(9) does not provide specific authority for 
an exemption based on prior approval, the exemptions in the rule are invalid.”).  
 136. See supra Section V.C.1. 
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the “class of powers and duties” analysis of Consolidated-Tomoka by 
relying first on the Save the Manatee Club quote, and section 
120.52(8) second. 
VI.   THE WOLF IN SHEEP’S CLOTHING:  
UNITED FACULTY OF FLORIDA V. FLORIDA  
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
 The United Faculty of Florida (“UFF”) challenged a rule amended 
by the State Board of Education (“Board”), which revised the “stand-
ards and criteria for ‘continuing contracts’ with full-time faculty 
members employed by Florida College System institutions.”137 “Con-
tinuing contract[s]” are “similar to tenure, and [are] viewed by some 
as a form of tenure.”138 Although the term is not expressly defined in 
the rule that was at issue in the case (rule 6A-14.0411 of the Florida 
Administrative Code), an employee that earns a continuing contract 
is able to keep his or her job without participating in an annual nom-
ination or reappointment process, with three exceptions: (i) for cause 
termination; (ii) termination for failure to meet the post-award per-
formance criteria set forth in Florida Administrative Code 6AA-
14.0411; and (iii) termination due to a change in the institution’s 
program or the required duties of a position.139  
 Continuing contracts have been regulated by the Board since 
1979.140 In 2013, the Board substantially revised its 2004 version of 
the rule to regulate these contracts in the following ways:  
[The Board i]ncrease[d] the period of satisfactory service necessary 
for an employee to obtain a continuing contract from three years to 
five years; prescribe[d] specific performance criteria to be used in 
determining whether to award or terminate a continuing contract; 
require[d] periodic performance reviews of employees working un-
der continuing contracts; require[d] each college to develop criteria 
to measure ‘student success’ and require[d] those criteria to be 
used in the employee’s performance review; and authorize[d] each 
college to establish positions that are eligible for multiple-year 
contracts rather than continuing contracts.141  
                                                                                                                       
 137. United Faculty of Fla. v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ., 157 So. 3d 514, 516 (Fla. 1st  
DCA 2015). 
 138. United Faculty of Fla., Case No. 13-2373RX, 2013 WL 6837574, at *2 (Fla. Div. 
Admin. Hearings Dec. 23, 2013); see also United Faculty, 157 So. 3d at 516 (describing 
continuing contracts as a “form of tenure”). 
 139. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 6A-14.0411(5), (7) (2015). As the 2015 version of the 
rule is identical to the 2013 version, all citations are to the current version of the rule.  
 140. United Faculty, 157 So. 3d at 516.  
 141. Id. 
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 UFF challenged the rule as an invalid exercise of rulemaking au-
thority and as a violation of the nondelegation doctrine.142 For the 
purposes of this Note, only the challenge to the Board’s rulemaking 
authority is pertinent.   
 The Board cited sections 1001.02(1), 1001.02(6), 1012.83(1), and 
1012.855(1)(a), Florida Statutes, as the sources of its rulemaking au-
thority.143 Section 1001.02(1) is a general grant of rulemaking author-
ity.144 Without this, an agency would never be able to adopt a rule.145 
Beyond its ability to fulfill a threshold requirement, however, section 
1001.02(1) does not provide separate rulemaking authority.146 
 Section 1001.02(6) states that “[t]he State Board of Education 
shall prescribe minimum standards, definitions, and guidelines for 
Florida College System institutions” for personnel and contracting.147 
Section 1012.83(1) entitles employees to “a contract as provided by 
rules of the State Board of Education.”148 Finally, section 
1012.855(1)(a) states that employment is “subject . . . to the rules of 
the State Board of Education relative to certification, tenure, leaves 
of absence of all types . . . and such other conditions of employment 
as the State Board of Education deems necessary and proper.”149  
 The ALJ found that only section 1001.02(6) provided the  
necessary rulemaking authority for the rule.150 UFF appealed this 
determination.151 The United Faculty majority152 found that all of the 
statutes contained a sufficient grant of rulemaking authority.153 Its 
analysis consisted of the following: 
Although these latter two statutes [sections 1012.83(1) and 
1012.855(1)(a)] are not phrased as affirmative directives to the 
                                                                                                                       
 142. Id. 
 143. See id. at 517. The 2015 versions of these statutes are identical to the 2013 
versions. All citations to these statutes are to the current version.   
 144. See FLA. STAT. § 1001.02(1) (2015) (“[The Board] has authority . . . pursuant to 
[sections] 120.536(1) and 120.54 to implement the provisions of law conferring duties upon 
it for the improvement of . . . K-20 public education except for the State University 
System.”). 
 145. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (“A grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not 
sufficient to allow an agency to adopt a rule; a specific law to be implemented is also 
required.”).  
 146. See id. 
 147. § 1001.02(6). 
 148. FLA. STAT. § 1012.83(1) (2015).  
 149. § 1012.855(1)(a). 
 150. United Faculty of Fla. v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ., 157 So. 3d 514, 516 (Fla. 1st  
DCA 2015). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Judge Wetherell wrote the opinion for the court; Judge Makar concurred, and 
Judge Clark dissented. See id. at 519. 
 153. Id. at 516-17.  
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Board, they clearly indicate that the Legislature intended that the 
Board adopt rules concerning employment contracts for college in-
structional personnel and that such rules address “tenure” and 
other terms and conditions of employment. . . . [I]t is not necessary 
under Save the Manatee Club and its progeny for the statutes to 
delineate every aspect of tenure that the Board is authorized to 
address by rule; instead, all that is necessary is for the statutes to 
specifically authorize the Board to adopt rules for college faculty 
contracts and tenure, which the statutes clearly do.154 
 There are two important points embedded in this paragraph. 
First, the majority admitted that sections 1012.83(1) and 
1012.855(1)(a) are not “affirmative directives to the Board.”155 Second, 
the majority relied on Save the Manatee Club’s “specific enough” 
statement for its determination that the statutes did not have to “de-
lineate every aspect of tenure”156 in order for the Board to pass a rule 
(i.e., the grant of rulemaking authority did not have to be detailed). 
Together, these points show that the courts have returned to the 
Consolidated-Tomoka “class of powers and duties” analysis.  
A.   Sections 1012.83(1) and 1012.855(1)(a) Are Not Affirmative 
Directives to the Board—So Why Continue Discussing Them? 
 When the majority admitted that sections 1012.83(1) and 
1012.855(1)(a) were not “affirmative directives to the Board,”157 it 
was, in essence, stating that the rule enacted by the Board was not 
implementing or interpreting “specific powers and duties granted by 
the enabling statute.”158 Instead, the majority found that the statutes 
should be interpreted as grants of rulemaking authority to regulate 
continuing contracts because that must have been what the legisla-
ture “intended.”159 This is in direct conflict with two provisions of sec-
tion 120.52(8): the insufficiency of a general grant of rulemaking au-
thority and the legislature’s express revocation of the “class of powers 
and duties” analysis.160  
 First, sections 1012.83(1) and 1012.855(1)(a) do not in and of 
themselves direct the Board to do anything. Section 1012.83(1) enti-
tles employees to contracts, and section 1012.855(1)(a) subjects em-
                                                                                                                       
 154. Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
 155. Id. at 517. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id.  
 158. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (2015). 
 159. United Faculty, 157 So. 3d at 517-18. 
 160. § 120.52(8); United Faculty, 157 So. 3d at 520 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“The lack of 
explicit legislative authorization for the adoption of this comprehensive rule is fatal to its 
validity.”); United Faculty of Fla., Case No. 13-2373RX, 2013 WL 6837574, at *10 (Fla. Div. 
Admin. Hearings Dec. 23, 2013). 
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ployees to the rules of the Board in certain employment contexts.161 
Section 120.52(8) states that “[a] grant of rulemaking authority is 
necessary but not sufficient to allow an agency to adopt a rule; a spe-
cific law to be implemented is also required.”162 At most, the statutory 
text of these provisions supports the conclusion that the Board has 
authority elsewhere in the statute to implement rules for contracts 
and to enforce those rules against its employees. But sections 
1012.83(1) and 1012.855(1)(a) do not contain “a specific law to be  
implemented.”163  
 Second, sections 1012.83(1) and 1012.855(1)(a) simply set out a 
“general legislative intent or policy;”164 namely, that employees have 
contracts and that those contracts may be subject to the rules of the 
Board in certain contexts. General legislative intent or policy is not 
enough to justify agency promulgation of a rule that is related to that 
general policy.165 The majority admitted that these provisions were 
not “affirmative directives to the Board,” and that they simply con-
formed to the legislature’s intent that the agency promulgate rules 
concerning employment contracts.166 After finding that sections 
1012.83(1) and 1012.855(1)(a) were not affirmative directives to the 
Board, the First DCA should have invalidated the rules promulgated 
by the Board under these statutes.  
 This result—that sections 1012.83(1) and 1012.855(1)(a) do not 
collectively provide the requisite rulemaking authority—is not 
changed by adding section 1001.02(6) to the mix. The United Faculty 
majority rejected the ALJ’s determination that section 1001.02(6) es-
tablished the proper rulemaking authority by itself.167 Its holding, in 
essence, stands for the idea that the whole is greater than the sum of 
                                                                                                                       
 161. See FLA. STAT. §§ 1012.83(1), .855(1)(a) (2015).  
 162. § 120.52(8). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id.; see also United Faculty, 157 So. 3d at 520 (Clark, J., dissenting).  
 166. United Faculty, 157 So. 3d at 517.  
 167. Id. Although the United Faculty opinion is not the model of clarity, its holding 
suggests that the only way to uphold the proposed rule was to find that the statutory 
provisions collectively provided the requisite rulemaking authority. The opinion suggests 
this in two ways. First, the majority stated that the statues “collectively and in conjunction 
with section 1001.02(1)” provided the proper rulemaking authority for the proposed rule. 
Id. at 518. Second, the First DCA utilized the tipsy coachman doctrine to uphold the ALJ’s 
determination. Id. The tipsy coachman doctrine states that “if a trial court reaches the 
right result, but for the wrong reasons, it will be upheld if there is any basis which would 
support the judgment in the record.” Dade Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 
2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999). The majority would not have utilized the tipsy coachman doctrine 
unless the ALJ’s reasoning was erroneous in some way. If section 1001.02(6) were 
sufficient by itself, it would have been unnecessary to even reach the question of whether 
the statutes collectively provided rulemaking authority. The only reason to bolster the 
analysis with sections 1012.83 and 1012.855(1)(a) would be if section 1001.02(6) was 
insufficient by itself (for some unexplained reason).  
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its parts—all of the statutory provisions can together provide the 
rulemaking authority that none can provide individually. However, 
this requires accepting the idea that zero plus zero somehow equals 
one. It clearly does not. If 1012.83(1) is insufficient, 1012.855(1)(a) is 
insufficient, and 1001.02(6) is insufficient, then together they still 
add up to nothing.168 
B.   Sections 1001.02(6), 1012.83(1), and 1012(1)(a) Do  
Not Have to Delineate Every Aspect of Tenure 
 The majority’s finding that sections 1001.02(6), 1012.83(1), and 
1012.855(1)(a) were grants of rulemaking authority also violates the 
legislature’s explicit revocation of the class of powers and duties 
analysis set out in Consolidated-Tomoka.169 In doing so, it begs the 
question: how “specific” does a grant of authority have to be in order 
to qualify as a grant of rulemaking authority under section 
120.52(8)? Section 1001.02(6) specifically allows the Board to create 
minimum guidelines for contracts but says nothing about what the 
limitations of those guidelines should be. Neither section 1012.83(1) 
nor section 1012.855(a)(1) expressly states that the Board can enact 
rules regarding continuing contracts. In combination, they only ref-
erence a legislative intent that “the Board adopt rules concerning 
employment contracts for college instructional personnel and that 





                                                                                                                       
 168. The way in which the United Faculty majority used an amalgam of statutory 
provisions to create “specific” rulemaking authority is questionable in and of itself. The 
idea that a mash-up of several different statutory provisions somehow creates a specific 
grant of rulemaking authority does not appear to conform to the limitations set forth in 
section 120.52(8). As the First DCA stated in Day Cruise: 
Under the 1996 and 1999 amendments to the APA, it is now clear, agencies 
have rulemaking authority only where the Legislature has enacted a specific 
statute, and authorized the agency to implement it, and then only if the 
(proposed) rule implements or interprets specific powers or duties, as opposed 
to improvising in an area that can be said to fall only generally within some 
class of powers or duties the Legislature has conferred on the agency.  
State, Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Day Cruise Ass’n, 794 So. 2d 
696, 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This quote suggests that 
in order to comply with section 120.52(8), the agency must be able to point to a specific 
provision within a single statute that provides rulemaking authority, not (as the United 
Faculty majority would have it) to a multitude of vague statutory provisions.   
 169. See § 120.52(8). 
 170. United Faculty, 157 So. 3d at 517 (combining section 1012.83’s reference to 
contracts and section 1012.855’s reference to tenure but not contracts). 
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 1.   Section 1001.02(6) 
 Section 1001.02(6) states that “[t]he State Board of Education 
shall prescribe minimum standards, definitions, and guidelines for 
Florida College System institutions” for personnel and contracting.171 
As discussed above, the majority opinion in United Faculty did not 
explain why the ALJ was incorrect in determining that section 
1001.02(6) was sufficient in and of itself to grant the Board rulemak-
ing authority as applied to continuing contracts. If section 1001.02(6) 
was not sufficient by itself,172 the majority did not explain why that 
would be.   
 Under one reading of the statutory text, section 1001.02(6) is suf-
ficiently broad to encompass continuing contracts under the legisla-
ture’s directive that the Board establish minimum standards and 
guidelines for contracting.173 Because the legislature directed the 
Board to establish minimum guidelines for contracting, the legisla-
ture did not need to say anything more “specific” in order to create a 
grant of rulemaking authority.174 This interpretation highlights a 
problem inherently intertwined with section 120.52(8)’s mandate 
that rulemaking authority stem from a specific legislative grant: how 
much specificity is required in order to find that the legislature has 
granted the agency rulemaking authority? Here, authorizing the 
Board to create minimum standards for contracting is a very broad 
grant of authority, and the legislature did not indicate what the 
“minimum guidelines” should address. Is that a “specific” power 
granted to the Board, as section 120.52(8) requires? Finding that sec-
tion 1001.02(6)’s directive to establish minimum guidelines for con-
tracting is sufficient to create rulemaking authority is arguably in 
conflict with section 120.52(8)’s provision that “[n]o agency shall have 
authority to adopt a rule only because it is reasonably related to the 
purpose of the enabling legislation.”175  
 As the dissent in United Faculty noted, just because a rule “is  
related to the subject of the enabling legislation—personnel and con-
tracting—that is insufficient.”176 The dissent argued that section 
1001.02(6) was not a sufficient grant of rulemaking authority because 
the legislature only gave a general grant of rulemaking authority 
without subsequently identifying specific, identified powers or du-
                                                                                                                       
 171. FLA. STAT. § 1001.02(6) (2015). 
 172. See United Faculty of Fla., Case No. 13-2373RX, 2013 WL 6837574, at *10 (Fla. 
Div. Admin. Hearings Dec. 23, 2013) (finding that only section 1001.02(6) provided the 
necessary rulemaking authority). 
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. 
 175. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (2015). 
 176. United Faculty, 157 So. 3d at 520 (Clark, J., dissenting).  
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ties.177 Thus, a determination that section 1001.02(6) granted the 
Board rulemaking authority would violate section 120.52(8). Of 
course, following the dissent’s analysis in United Faculty could lead 
to the problem that Consolidated-Tomoka and Save the Manatee Club 
advocated against: an implementing statute does not need to be de-
tailed, it just has to be specific. Requiring the legislature to enumer-
ate what exactly constitutes “contracting” may demand more detail 
than is necessary or mandated by section 120.52(8).  
 The decision whether section 1001.02(6) is a specific grant of legis-
lative authority is a close call, and it is a perfect example of the diffi-
culties that section 120.52(8) places on the legislature as well as the 
courts.178 “Contracting” is a broad, undefined word, and it is by no 
means clear that “continuing contracts” should fall under that cate-
gory.179 It is difficult for the courts to adhere to a strict rulemaking 
authority standard when the legislature promulgates enabling stat-
utes that walk a thin line between being statements of “general legis-
lative intent or policy” (which are not sufficient to create rulemaking 
authority) and broadly drafted—yet still specific—powers or duties 
(which are sufficient).180 The courts are forced to balance the stric-
tures of section 120.52(8) with the knowledge that the legislature in-
tended to let the agencies do something.  
 However, section 120.52(8) addresses this problem as well: “Statu-
tory language granting rulemaking authority or generally describing 
the powers and functions of an agency shall be construed to extend 
no further than implementing or interpreting the specific powers and 
duties conferred by the enabling statute.”181 Section 120.52(8) places 
the burden on the legislature to draft clearly. If there is a dispute 
over whether the legislature actually granted the agency authority 
for a particular rule, then the court should err on the side of caution 
and deny deference to the agency.182 On the sliding scale of specifici-
ty,183 the legislature chose to require more specificity, not less. The 
United Faculty dissent was correct; there was nothing specific in the 
statutory provisions cited by the Board that provided the Board the 
authority to “develop[] broad policy for continuing contracts for State 
                                                                                                                       
 177. Id. at 521.  
 178. See Boyd, Legislative Checks on Rulemaking, supra note 13, at 350-51. 
 179. See infra Section VI.B.2. 
 180. See § 120.52(8). 
 181. Id. 
 182. See Boyd, Legislative Checks on Rulemaking, supra note 13, at 351 (“The new 
legislative check provisions, operating in concert, urge the possibility that policy not clearly 
established in the statue should simply not be enforced until it is clarified by the 
Legislature itself.”). 
 183. See supra Section III.B. (illustrating the difference between the degree of 
specificity required under the class of powers and duties analysis and the degree of 
specificity required under the 1999 Amendments). 
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university and college faculty.”184 In a situation in which the legisla-
ture says nothing about continuing contracts, section 120.52(8) places 
the burden on the legislature to draft more clearly and, concurrently, 
a burden on the courts to narrowly construe legislative grants of 
rulemaking authority. 
 2.   Sections 1012.83(1) and 1012.855(1)(a) 
 As discussed above, section 1012.83(1) entitles employees to con-
tracts, and section 1012.855(1)(a) subjects employees to the rules of 
the Board in certain employment contexts.185 There are two problems 
with sections 1012.83(1) and 1012.855(1)(a): (1) the failure to classify 
continuing contracts as a form of tenure or a contract and (2) the un-
certain level of specificity required to grant rulemaking authority. 
This Note addresses each of these problems in turn. 
 The United Faculty majority opinion did not specify whether it 
considered continuing contracts to be a form of tenure or a “tenure-
like” contract.186 It is more likely that the court considered continuing 
contracts to be a hybrid.187 But the position that continuing contracts 
are a hybrid—both contracts and tenure—is a statutory nightmare 
for two reasons: (1) “tenure” and “contract” are not defined by the leg-
islature, and (2) “contracts” and “tenure” are mutually exclusive 
terms in these statutory provisions.   
 a.   Defining Tenure and Continuing Contract 
 The legislature did not define “tenure” or “continuing contract.” 
When the legislature does not define a term, canons of construction 
take over.188 Further, when a term is not defined by the legislature, 
the canons of construction require that the words be given their 
“plain and ordinary meaning,” allowing the meaning of those words 
to be derived from a dictionary.189  
                                                                                                                       
 184. United Faculty of Fla. v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ., 157 So. 3d 514, 521 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2015) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 185. See FLA. STAT. §§ 1012.83(1), .855(1)(a) (2015). 
 186. Compare United Faculty, 157 So. 3d at 516 (“Continuing contracts . . . are viewed 
as a form of tenure”), with id. at 517 (describing continuing contracts as “tenure-like 
contracts”). But see id. at 520 (Clark, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he parties agree that 
continuing contracts are the equivalent of tenure.”).  
 187. See id. at 517-18 (“[A]ll that is necessary is for the statutes to specifically 
authorize the Board to adopt rules for college faculty contracts and tenure, which the 
statutes clearly do.”) (emphasis added). 
 188. See Nehme v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 863 So. 2d 201, 204  
(Fla. 2003). 
 189. Id. at 204-05. 
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 “Tenure” is “a status granted after a trial period to a teacher that 
gives protection from summary dismissal.”190 “Continuing contract” is 
simply a descriptive phrase: it is a contract that is “continuous” or 
“constant.”191 These terms are given further meaning by looking to 
other statutory provisions.192 In a separate title of the Florida Stat-
utes, the legislature defined “continuing contract” as “a written 
agreement that is automatically renewed until terminated by one of 
the parties to the contract.”193 From a simple comparison of the 
terms, it appears that tenure can exist without a contract, but a con-
tinuing contract is necessarily premised on a contract that does  
not end.   
 It is clear from the definitions of “tenure” and “continuing con-
tract” that they overlap, because both make it difficult to terminate 
the employment relationship. Continuing contracts are different from 
tenure because continuing contracts are also (surprise) “contracts.” 
One would expect the legislature to recognize the dual nature of con-
tinuing contracts and either put them squarely in (1) the “contract” 
class, (2) the “tenure” class, or (3) a class unto themselves. In numer-
ous statutory provisions, the legislature had the opportunity to use 
the words “continuing contracts” or to otherwise clarify the relation-
ship between continuing contracts and tenure. It did not. This sug-
gests that there cannot be rulemaking authority for a concept that is 
not mentioned anywhere in the statutory text cited by the Board.  
 b.   Contracts and Tenure Are Exclusionary Terms 
 The statutory text also suggests that contracts and tenure are mu-
tually exclusive: if continuing contracts are classified as “contracts,” 
they cannot also be “tenure,” and vice versa.194 Section 1012.83(1) on-
ly mentions an employee right to contracts, but section 1012.855(1)(a) 
distinguishes between tenure and other conditions of employment. 
Conditions of employment would presumably include contracts (and 
                                                                                                                       
 190. Tenure, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tenure 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2016). 
 191. Continuing, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/continuing 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2016).  
 192. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Fletcher, 573 So. 2d 941, 944 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (finding 
that courts are to harmonize interpretations of statutes dealing with the same subject 
matter when possible). 
 193. FLA. STAT. § 443.091(3)(g)2 (2015).  
 194. See Lamar Outdoor Advert.–Lakeland v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 17 So. 3d 799, 802 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“A subsection of a statute cannot be read in isolation; instead, it must 
be read ‘within the context of the entire section in order to ascertain legislative intent for 
the provision’ and each statute ‘must be read as a whole with meaning ascribed to every 
portion and due regard given to the semantic and contextual interrelationship between its 
parts.’ ” (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Contractpoint Fla. Parks, 986 So. 2d 1260, 
1265 (Fla. 2008))).  
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within that term, continuing contracts), since each employee is enti-
tled to a contract pursuant to section 1012.83(1). The use of the word 
tenure, as separate from conditions of employment—which encom-
passes continuing contracts under the term “contracts”—suggests 
that tenure is a distinct condition of employment that is not included 
within the term “contracts.”  
 There would be no tension between sections 1001.02(6), 
1012.83(1), and 1012.855(1)(a) if continuing contracts were classified 
as contracts and tenure was treated as its own separate concept. Sec-
tion 1012.855(1)(a) is the only statutory provision to mention tenure 
and the catch-all provision, “conditions of employment.”195 If “condi-
tions of employment” was interpreted to include “contracts,” and con-
tinuing contracts were a form of contract, then there would be no con-
flict within section 1012.855(1)(a). But this is not the route the  
majority took.  
 The majority stated that continuing contracts are a form of ten-
ure, irrespective of the suggestion that the majority may have 
thought of continuing contracts as both tenure and contracts.196 By 
finding that continuing contracts are a form of tenure, the majority 
put the statutory provisions in conflict. In essence, defining continu-
ing contracts as a form of tenure, or equivalent to tenure, makes sec-
tion 1012.855(1)(a) redundant. The canons of statutory construction 
forbid this.197 Therefore, a finding that tenure was the equivalent of a 
continuing contract should have led to the exact opposite result in 
this case: that there could be no rulemaking authority for continuing 
contracts because of the tension between the terms “tenure” and 
“contract.”    
 3.   The Specificity of the Statutory Provisions: What Degree of 
Specificity Is Required Under Section 120.52(8)? 
 As previously discussed, the dubious grant of statutory authority 
in section 1001.02(6) has already raised the issue of how specific a 
grant of authority needs to be in order to actually grant rulemaking 
authority.198 With section 1001.02(6), the legislature arguably created 
the very class of powers and duties analysis it sought to avoid by 
                                                                                                                       
 195. FLA. STAT. § 1012.855(1)(a) (2015). 
 196. See supra Section VI.B.2. 
 197. See Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 198-99 (Fla. 2007) (“[A] basic 
rule of statutory construction provides that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless 
provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute 
meaningless.” (quoting Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So. 2d 360, 
366 (Fla. 2005))).  
 198. Section 1001.02(6) states that “[t]he State Board of Education shall prescribe 
minimum standards, definitions, and guidelines for Florida College System institutions” 
for personnel and contracting. FLA. STAT. § 1001.02(6) (2015).  
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drafting the statutory provision too broadly. In the case of sections 
1012.83(1) and 1012.855(1)(a),199 however, the United Faculty majori-
ty created the class of powers and duties difficulties all on its own. 
The problem rests in the misuse of Save the Manatee Club’s well-
known statement: “The question is whether the statute contains a 
specific grant of legislative authority for the rule, not whether the 
grant of authority is specific enough. Either the enabling statute au-
thorizes the rule at issue or it does not.”200  
 When taken out of the defining context of Consolidated-Tomoka, 
the quote can be interpreted to mean that the courts may use very 
broad statutory language to satisfy the specificity requirement. This 
is exactly what the court did in United Faculty when it determined 
that mere implications of legislative intent were sufficient to satisfy a 
grant of rulemaking authority. Unfortunately, not only did the major-
ity in United Faculty misconstrue the context in which Save the 
Manatee Club framed the statute, it also ignored the legislature’s ex-
press prohibition against allowing grants of rulemaking authority 
that fall within an agency’s class of duties and powers. United Facul-
ty effectively returned to the Consolidated-Tomoka analysis.  
VII.   JUSTIFICATIONS, EXPLANATIONS, AND SOLUTIONS—WHY DID 
UNITED FACULTY RETURN TO CONSOLIDATED-TOMOKA  
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT? 
 Although this Note fully expects that United Faculty’s decision 
has reopened the door to the class of powers and duties analysis that 
the legislature expressly prohibited, is that opinion justified? The 
short answer is that United Faculty is a very recent decision; its ef-
fect, if any, on section 120.52(8) challenges remains to be seen. As of 
yet, only one DOAH decision has cited United Faculty.201 The order 
did no more than state that United Faculty “neatly summarizes the 
standards for a rule challenge under section 120.52(8)(b),”202 and find 
that the Agency for Health Care Administration had met those 
                                                                                                                       
 199. Section 1012.83(1) entitles employees to contracts, and section 1012.855(1)(a) 
subjects employees to the rules of the Board in certain employment contexts. See FLA. 
STAT. §§ 1012.83(1), .855(1)(a) (2015). Section 120.52(8) states that “[a] grant of rulemaking 
authority is necessary but not sufficient to allow an agency to adopt a rule; a specific law to 
be implemented is also required.” FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (2015). 
 200. Sw. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc., 773 So. 2d 594, 599 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2000). 
 201. Bayfront Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 14-4758RU, 2015 WL 1875289 (Fla. Div. Admin. 
Hearings Apr. 20, 2015).  
 202. Id. at *14. 
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standards.203 Beyond that, however, the order did not analyze United 
Faculty in depth.204 Thus, only time will tell what impact United 
Faculty will have on section 120.52(8) rulemaking challenges. 
 United Faculty’s return to the Consolidated-Tomoka class of pow-
ers and duties analysis, despite the fact that the legislature clearly 
overturned Consolidated-Tomoka’s reasoning, raises the question as 
to why United Faculty would essentially ignore a legislative man-
date. Section 120.52(8) rulemaking authority challenges often involve 
close questions about the specificity of statutory language. This Note 
does not suggest that the court in United Faculty was intentionally 
trying to reach a result contrary to that required by section 120.52(8). 
Rather, the outcome of Consolidated-Tomoka is a combination of the 
influence of the federal standard of review of agency decisions and 
the misapplication of the “specific enough” quote from Save the Man-
atee Club. Thus, the courts should return to the Day Cruise analysis 
because of (1) the courts’ track record of returning to the federal ad-
ministrative system every time the legislature has attempted to curb 
agency discretion and (2) the misapplication of Save the Manatee 
Club.  Federal influence on Florida courts’ analysis of agency deci-
sions can be seen particularly after the amendments the legislature 
made in the 1974 APA.205 After the adoption of the 1974 APA, Florida 
courts started to import federal administrative law into their anal-
yses wholesale.206 As a result, the legislature tried again to change 
the course that the courts had chartered in its 1996 and 1999 
amendments.207 But it appears that federal administrative law has a 
tremendous pull on Florida courts, and they are still unwilling to fol-
low the legislature’s decision to have a less deferential administrative 
law system.208  
                                                                                                                       
 203. See id. at *15.  
 204. See id. at *14-15. 
 205. See Boyd, A Traveler’s Guide, supra note 16, at 250-56 (describing three models of 
administration (classical, procedural, and evaluative) and Florida’s compilation of the 
classical and procedural models in the 1974 APA). 
 206. Id. at 263-70.  
 207. Id. at 270 (discussing the success of the 1974 APA and its integration of the 
classical and procedural models, and stating that “[i]t is, of course, not obvious that the 
Act’s attempt to balance the two models would have succeeded, but it is clear to many that 
the rejection of that balance by the courts in favor of the prevailing procedural model of 
federal law has failed”) (footnote omitted). 
 208. See Jim Rossi, “Statutory Nondelegation”: Learning from Florida’s Recent 
Experience in Administrative Procedure Reform, 8 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 301, 341-42 (1999) 
(discussing the 1996 and 1999 APA reforms and stating, “[i]n Florida, something similar to 
Chevron deference has been endorsed de jure, but given our institutional setup there is a 
de facto reluctance to apply it across the board”); see also Bernard W. Bell, The Model APA 
and the Scope of Judicial Review: Importing Chevron into State Administrative Law, 20 
WIDENER L.J. 801, 839 (2011) (noting that section 120.536 of the Florida APA, which is the 
same language of the flush-left paragraph in section 120.52(8), “clearly reflect[s] a more 
limited view of agencies’ powers than Chevron”).       
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 This trend of the Florida courts to steer back to a broader defer-
ence standard—irrespective of the legislature’s mandates—is con-
cerning. It indicates that no matter what the legislature does, the 
courts will find a way to get around it. In a way, the misapplication of 
Save the Manatee Club and the deliberate avoidance of Day Cruise 
can be seen as the manifestation of that trend.209 Statements of law 
and how that law should be implemented can easily be taken out of 
context, of which the Save the Manatee Club quotation is a perfect 
example. But it is astounding that for fifteen years, no one in the 
Florida courts has questioned the application of that quote in rule-
making challenge decisions. It is equally astounding that the judici-
ary has allowed Day Cruise, which is a much narrower interpretation 
of the 1999 version of section 120.52(8), and Save the Manatee Club 
to stand side-by-side without comment.  
 Thus, the legislature should not attempt to amend section 
120.52(8) again; rather, the judiciary should return to Day Cruise. It 
would be feasible for the courts to adopt the analysis of Day Cruise, 
even at this late date. In fact, the courts could use Day Cruise to limit 
the Save the Manatee Club quote.210 This would at the very least 
harmonize the two decisions, and the result would probably lead to a 
stricter adherence to the text of section 120.52(8). So while it seems a 
legislative amendment would have little to no effect, a conscious 
choice in the judiciary to return to an already-existing strain of anal-
ysis would have that result. 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
 The line between permissible agency action pursuant to delegated 
rulemaking authority and an invalid exercise of rulemaking authori-
ty can often be a close call. The Florida legislature determined in 
1996 and again in 1999 that it would prefer to restrict agency rule-
making authority to those actions that are specifically delegated to 
the agency. In furtherance of that policy choice, the legislature inval-
idated Consolidated-Tomoka, which would have allowed agency 
rulemaking authority as long as the promulgated rule fell within the 
agency’s “class of powers and duties.” United Faculty has returned to 
the Consolidated-Tomoka analysis, and as a result, it has once again 
provided a way for the Florida courts to defer to agency discretion. 
The court’s return to a broader rulemaking authority standard is  
                                                                                                                       
 209. This Note recognizes that Day Cruise is often cited in court opinions; however, 
Day Cruise is not usually cited independently of Save the Manatee Club. The courts equate 
the opinions when they cite them together, which, for reasons discussed in Part V,  
is incorrect. 
 210. See Lamar Outdoor Advert.–Lakeland v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 17 So. 3d 799, 801-
02 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (citing the Save the Manatee Club “specific enough” statement but 
limiting its opinion with the Day Cruise three-part analysis).  
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due in large part to the misapplication of Save the Manatee Club’s 
“specific enough” quotation. If courts recognize how that quote has 
been misapplied, they can change course and conform with the legis-
lature’s intent once again.  
 
